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Abstract In this paper, we introduce a new cryptographic
primitive: adaptable KP-ABE with time interval (KP-TIABE),
which is an extension of key-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (KP-ABE). Adaptable KP-TIABE specifies a decryption
time interval for every ciphertext such that the ciphertext
can only be decrypted within this time interval. To be more
flexible, the decryption time interval associated with a cipher-
text can be adjusted on demand by a semi-trusted server. We
propose a formal model for adaptable KP-TIABE, present a
concrete adaptable KP-TIABE scheme and prove its security
under the security model.
Keywords Adaptable key-policy attribute-based
encryption · Time specific · Adaptability
1 Introduction
To provide data security and privacy in cloud storage, a com-
mon practice is using encryption. However, how to share
encrypted data in a scalable and flexible manner has been
a challenging problem. Attribute-based encryption (ABE)
(Goyal et al. 2006; Waters 2011; Sahai and Waters 2005),
which encrypts messages with respect to attributes or access
policies defined over a set of attributes, is considered as
a very promising solution to the above challenge. There
are two types of ABE schemes: ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) (Waters 2011) and key-policy
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attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) (Goyal et al. 2006).
In CP-ABE, a user’s private key is associated with a set of
attributes and a ciphertext is associated with an access pol-
icy over attributes. The ciphertext can be decrypted only if
the user’s attributes satisfy the access policy of the cipher-
text. KP-ABE is the dual of CP-ABE in which a ciphertext
is associated with a set of attributes and a user’s private key
is associated with an access policy over attributes. The user
can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if the set of attributes
in the ciphertext satisfies the access policy associated with
the private key.
In many information processing systems, time is a crit-
ical consideration. For example, sensitive data related to a
project may only be accessible to project members while
the project is active, and the data should be made inaccessi-
ble before or after the project duration. The first attempt to
design time-sensitive encryption is the time-release encryp-
tion (TRE) scheme by May (1993) in which a ciphertext can
only be decrypted after a specific release time. Paterson and
Quaglia (2010) introduced time-specific encryption (TSE) as
a generalization of TRE. The basic idea of TSE is that each
user has a time instant key, and he/she can decrypt cipher-
texts as long as the time specified in time instant key falls in
the time intervals associated with the ciphertexts.
In this paper, we introduce a new notion of ABE, called
Adaptable key-policy based encryption with time interval
(KP-TIABE), which simultaneously achieves properties of
attribute-based and time-specific encryptions in an efficient
manner. Adaptable KP-TIABE novelly combines KP-ABE
(Goyal et al. 2006), adaptable CP-ABE (Lai et al. 2014) and
TSE (Paterson and Quaglia 2010). In adaptable KP-TIABE,
a ciphertext is not only associated with a set of descriptive
attributes, but also a decryption time interval. A user has a
private key associated with an access policy over attributes
as in the standard KP-ABE, as well as time instant key as in
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TSE. The user is enable to decrypt the ciphertext only if the
set of attributes in the ciphertext satisfies the access policy
and the time instant specified in the time instant key falls in
the decryption time interval of the ciphertext. In adaptable
KP-TIABE, a user receives a private key associated with an
access policy from a Key Generation Center. A semi-trusted
Time Server broadcasts a global system parameter and a time
instant key (TIK) at each time interval to all users. To make
the decryption time interval adjustable, another semi-trusted
party, called Adaptation Server, is introduced in adaptable
KP-TIABE. The adaptation server is able to convert a cipher-
text under a certain decryption time interval into another
ciphertext of the same plaintext under a different decryption
time interval but without learning anything about the plain-
text. We present a formal model for adaptable KP-TIABE,
provide a concrete construction and prove its security under
the security model.
1.1 Application of adaptable KP-TIABE
Below we present some examples of applications that are
suitable for our algorithm. Cloud computing is a powerful
platform for data sharing, and our scheme could be used to
ensure the confidentiality of the outsourced data in cloud
storage.
Cloud data with time constraints Cloud computing, which
contains massive storage capacity, provides a convenient sce-
nario for users to rent the cloud server and share their data.
Since cloud could be used by everyone, the data owner may
not want the cloud and other irrelevant people to get the data.
The basic idea is that the data could be encrypted before
outsourcing to ensure its confidentiality.
In practice, data accessing often obeys the fine-grained
access control rules. For example, suppose that a company
constitutes a confidential group for a confidential project.
They need to rent a cloud server for data sharing among
their internal group. Access control rules must make sure
that only the researcher who belongs to this confidential
group is allowed to access the data. Undoubtedly, KP-ABE is
an appropriate method to achieve this type of cryptographic
access control.
However, every confidential project has a deadline. After
this deadline, all the related data in the cloud are not allowed
to be accessed by anyone. This is not a rare phenomenon in
the real world. Based on this phenomenon, defining a time
interval (i.e., survival time) for the data is essential. This time
interval could be the period that this project lasts. Within this
period, researchers could decrypt the data with their private
keys.
Adaptable KP-TIABE provides an effective solution for
handling the task to restrict decryption time interval. Specif-
ically, private key is generated by both policy server and
time server, and it contains the access structure and the time
point represented when user obtains the private key. While
decrypting, each private key is not only associated with an
access structure, which describes the specific types of cipher-
text that the access structure satisfied, but also related to the
time point that should correspond to the time interval.
Time constraints modification Considering the above sce-
nario again, time interval modification is another phenom-
enon that may happen. For example, the project has to be
finished earlier due to the funding limitation. Thus, we need
to modify the decryption time interval. A straightforward
method is to download the encrypted data from the cloud
and decrypt it to extract the original data. Then, re-encrypt it
with a new time interval and upload it again. Obviously, this
is a redundant task if there are large amount of data involved.
Adaptable KP-TIABE re-encrypts data to the cloud effi-
ciently. To maintain the data confidentiality against the
cloud, data owner provides a new time interval to the
time-modified server, which is given a trapdoor for modi-
fication. This re-encryption approach could also be applied
on resource-constrained devices (e.g., mobile devices) that
mobile devices are more popular nowadays, and it is much
convenient to use our approach to operate data in cloud.
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide
an overview of related work. In Sect. 3, we highlight some
standard notations and cryptographic definitions. In Sect. 4,
we present our formal model for adaptable KP-TIABE and
our concrete KP-TIABE scheme together with its security
analysis. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 7.
2 Related work
Attribute-based encryption, time-specific encryption and
proxy re-encryption are related to our work, which are briefly
reviewed below.
2.1 Attribute-based encryption
The original concept of ABE was proposed by Sahai and
Waters (2005), who presented a fuzzy identity-based encryp-
tion (IBE). Fuzzy IBE defines an identity as a set of attributes.
A message is encrypted by a set of attributes ω, and a decryp-
tion key is generated by another set of attributes ω′; then a
ciphertext can be decrypted if and only if | ω∩ω′ |≥ d, where
d is a threshold value. Goyal et al. (2006) introduced two
types of ABE: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-
policy ABE (CP-ABE). The difference lies in that in the
former, a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes,
a decryption key is associated with an access policy (also
called access structure), and decryption is successful only if
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the set of attributes satisfies the access policy, while the latter
is the other way around. In this paper, we focus on KP-ABE.
2.2 Time-specific encryption
The first notion of encryption scheme with time constraint
was introduced by May (1993), called time-release crypto,
where the goal is to encrypt a message that cannot be
decrypted by anyone, not even the sender, until a prede-
termined release time is passed. Then, Rivest et al. (1996)
proposed using time-lock puzzles to realize the notion of
time-release crypto, but they pose heavy computational load
on users. Blake and Chan (2004) constructed a time-release
encryption scheme in which a trusted time server is com-
pletely passive—no interaction between it and the sender or
receiver is needed, thus assuring the privacy of a message
and the anonymity of both its sender and receiver.
Paterson and Quaglia (2010) generalized the notion of
time-release crypto to time-specific encryption (TSE), which
extends the time constraint from a time instant to a time
interval [tL , tR]. Three types of TSE are presented in Paterson
and Quaglia (2010): plain TSE, public-key TSE and identity-
based TSE. The plain TSE is the basic form of TSE in which
a message is encrypted by a decryption time interval and
the ciphertext can only be decrypted if a user possesses a
time interval key (TIK) which falls within the decryption
time interval. The plain TSE is only related to the decryption
time interval, instead of any specific user. In the public-key
TSE, a message is encrypted by both a user’s public key and a
decryption time interval. Therefore, the user needs to decrypt
the ciphertext using her corresponding private key and a time
interval key which falls within the decryption time interval.
The identity TSE is related to a user’s identity in which a
message is encrypted by a decryption time interval and the
identity of the user. The user can extract the message using her
private key associated with her identity and an appropriate
time interval key. Note that both the public-key TSE and
the identity-based TSE are one-to-one schemes; hence, they
are not suitable for scalable access control of encrypted data
in the cloud computing scenario. Recently, Kasamatsu et al.
(2012) combined TSE with forward-secure encryption based
on hierarchical IBE (Boneh et al. 2005) which decreases the
size of both ciphertexts and public parameters.
2.3 Re-encryption
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first introduced by Blaze et al.
(1998) that employs a semi-trusted proxy to convert cipher-
texts encrypted using one key into ciphertexts encrypted
using another key while without learning anything about
the underlying plaintexts. However, the PRE in Blaze et al.
(1998) is based on the symmetric proxy function. Later,
Jakobsson (1999) proposed a more practical and efficient
asymmetric PRE.
To further strengthen PRE, Weng et al. (2009) proposed
the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE) that
defines a condition for a user’s public key and certain prop-
erties for a re-encryption key. A ciphertext can be converted
only if the properties satisfy the condition of the public key.
Yet, this scheme is not secure enough since conditions are
represented by keywords. Recently, Lai et al. (2014) intro-
duced the notion of adaptable CP-ABE. The key idea of
adaptable CP-ABE is the introduction of a new constraint
called trapdoor. Using the trapdoor, a semi-trusted server con-
verts a ciphertext with one access policy to another ciphertext
with another access policy while without learning the under-
lying plaintext message.
The notion of KP-TIABE combines the key features of
KP-ABE, TSE and adaptable CP-ABE, as will be described
in detail in the rest of the paper.
2.4 Application of cryptographic technique
Cryptographic techniques are rapidly used in our daily life.
They are applied to protect our communication, privacy and
some important data, etc. Identity-based encryption (Mora
Afonso and Carballero-Gil 2014) is used to protect users’
communication data when they are using mobile phone to
send e-mail or make payment. Moreover, a toolbox (Muñoz
et al. 2013) is proposed to defend the attack on smart card.
The toolbox controls digital oscilloscope which could trace
the operation.
3 Preliminary
In this section, we provide the definitions of access structures,
linear secret sharing schemes and bilinear groups.
3.1 Access structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure Beimel 1996) Let P =
{P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2P is
monotone for ∀B and C , if B ∈ A, B ∈ C , then C ∈ A. An
access structure(respectively, monotone access structure) is
a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-
empty subsets of P1, . . . , Pn , i.e., A ⊆ 2P\{∅}. The sets in
A are called authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called
unauthorized set.
In this paper, we focus on the monotone access structure
with sets of attributes, instead of parties.
3.2 Linear secret sharing schemes
We adopt the definition of linear secret sharing schemes from
Beimel (1996).
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Definition 2 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)) Let M
be a matrix with size of  × n. A secret sharing scheme 
for an access structure A over a set of parties P is defined
as a linear secret sharing scheme over Zp if it satisfies the
following:
1. The matrix M represents the share-generating matrix for
. Let ρ be a function from {1, . . . , } to P , which labels
each row of M. When we consider the column vector
v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be
shared, and r2, . . . , rn ∈ ZP are chosen randomly, then
Mv is the vector of  shares of the secret s according to
. The share Mi · v belongs to party ρ(i).
2. Letbe a LSSS for access structure A over a set of parties
P , which takes S ∈ A as input. Let I = {i | ρ(i) ∈ S},
where I ⊂ {1, . . . , }. For the existence constants {ωi ∈
Zp}i∈I , there is ∑i∈I ωiλi = s if λi are valid shares of
any secret s. Then we have
∑
i∈I ωi Mi = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
such that Mi denotes the i th row of A. However, no such
constant ωi exists for unauthorized sets.
Access structures could be described in monotonic
boolean formulas, which can be transformed to an LSSS rep-
resentation. When considering a boolean formulation as an
access tree with  nodes, the corresponding LSSS matrix
consists of  rows.
3.3 Bilinear groups
Let G, GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p.
Then e :G × G → GT is a bilinear map such that
1. Bilinearity: e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab, where u, v ∈
G, a, b ∈ Z∗p.
2. Non-degeneracy:e(ua, vb) = 1 whenever u, v = 1G.
3. Computable: The bilinear map e : G × G → GT can
be computed efficiently.
3.4 Decision bilinear Diffie–Hellman(BDH) assumption
Definition 3 (DBDH Problem) Let a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗p be cho-
sen uniformly at random. Given a bilinear group G of
prime order p and a generator g of GT . The elements
are defined as ga, gb, gc ∈ G, e(g, g)z ∈ GT . For a
fair binary coin β ∈ 0, 1, if β = 1, it outputs the tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc); otherwise, it outputs the
tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)z). The Decisional Bilin-
ear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) problem is to distinguish the
value β.
The advantage of an adversary A to distinguish the tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) from the tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)z) is denoted as
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) = 1]
− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)z) = 1]| (1)
where the probability is over the randomly chosen generator
g, the randomly chosen a, b, c, z in Zp and the random bits
consumed by A.
Definition 4 (DBDH assumption) The DBDH assumption
holds in G if no polynomial-time algorithm has a non-
negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
4 Adaptable key-policy attribute-based encryption
with time interval
In this section, we first present the formal definition of adapt-
able KP-ABE with time interval (KP-TIABE) and its formal
security model based on those of KP-ABE (Goyal et al. 2006)
and TSE (Paterson and Quaglia 2010). We then give a con-
crete construction of adaptable KP-TIABE.
A standard KP-ABE scheme defines four algorithms,
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. Adaptable KP-
TIABE consists of three servers: a fully trusted policy server
generates private keys for users, a semi-trusted time server
generates time instant keys, and another semi-trusted adap-
tation server modifies existing ciphertexts such that they are
associated with new time intervals while without learning
anything about the underlying plaintexts. Hence, in addition
to the four algorithms in the standard KP-ABE, adaptable KP-
TIABE includes several additional algorithms: Time.Setup
and Token run by the time server, and Adapt.Setup and
PolicyAdp run by the adaptation server.
Formally, an adaptable KP-TIABE consists of the follow-
ing algorithms:
(Global − Setup(λ)) takes a security parameter λ as input.
It outputs a system public parameters PP.
Setup(PP, U) takes the system public parameters PP and
a small universe of attributes U as inputs. It outputs an
attribute public parameter MPK and an attribute mas-
ter secret key MSK. This algorithm is run by the policy
server.
Time.Setup(PP, T ) takes as inputs the system’s public
parameters PP and the number of time periods T sup-
ported by the system. It outputs a time public parameter
and a time master secret key, which are related to time,
represented by TS-MPK and TS-MSK, respectively.
This algorithm is run by the time server, which is a semi-
trusted proxy.
Adapt.Setup(PP, T ) takes as inputs the system’s public
parameters PP and the number of time periods T sup-
ported by the system. It outputs an adaptable public
parameter Adp-MPK and an adaptable master secret key
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Adp-MSK. This algorithm is run by the adaptation server,
which is a semi-trusted proxy.
KeyGen(A, MPK, MSK) takes as inputs an access structure
A, the attribute master secret key MSK and the attribute
public parameter MPK. It outputs a private key ATR-SK
related to the access structure.
Token(t, TS-MPK, TS-MSK) takes as inputs a time point
t , the time public parameters TS-MPK, the time master
secret key TS-MSK. It outputs a time instant key TS-SK.
Encrypt (M, S, [tL , tR], MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK) takes
a message M , a set of attributes S, a time interval [tL , tR]
where tL ≤ tR , the attribute public parameters MPK, the
time public parameters TS-MPK and the adaptable pub-
lic parameters Adp-MPK as inputs. It outputs a ciphertext
CT .
PolicyAdp (Adp-MSK, CT, [t ′L , t ′R]) takes as inputs the
adaptable master secret key Adp-MSK, a ciphertext CT
under a time interval [tL , tR], and a new time interval
[t ′L , t ′R], where t ′L ≤ t ′R . It outputs a new ciphertext CT ′
under the new time interval [t ′L , t ′R].
Decrypt(CT, ATR-SK, TS-SK) takes as inputs the
ciphertext CT which is encrypted under a set of attributes
S, the private key ATR-SK with access control structure
A and time instant key TS-SK. If the set of attributes S
that are used to encrypt the ciphertext satisfy the access
structure A in the private key ATR-SK, and time point
specified in the time instant key TS-SK falls in the
decryption time interval, [tL , tR] (i.e., the time point t
satisfies the time constraint tL ≤ t ≤ tR), then the algo-
rithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a message
M ; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
For the correctness of decryption, we require that, for
all PP ← (Global − Setup(λ)), (MPK, MSK) ← Setup
(PP, U ), (TS-MPK, TS-MSK) ← Time.Setup (PP, T ),
(Adp-MPK, Adp-MSK) ← Adapt.Setup(PP, T ),
ATR-SK ← KeyGen(A, MPK, MSK), TS-SK ← Token
(t, TS-MPK, TS-MSK), CT ← Encrypt(M, S, [tL , tR],
MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK), CT ′ ← PolicyAdp
(Adp-MSK, CT, [t ′L , t ′R]), the following conditions hold:
1. If the requirements shown as follows are satisfied, then
M ← Decrypt(CT , ATR-SK, TS-SK):
[Attribute Constraint.] The set S of attributes satisfies
the access structure A.
[Time Interval Constraint.] The time point t satisfies
tL ≤ t ≤ tR .
2. The distribution of CT ′ and Encrypt(M, S, [t ′L , t ′R],
MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK) are identical.
5 Security model for adaptable KP-TIABE
We consider three types of adversaries in adaptable KP-
TIABE. Type 1 adversaries, who are allowed to query for
any private keys related to the access structures that can-
not be used to decrypt the challenge ciphertext, model
adversaries in the standard KP-ABE; Type 2 adversaries
are allowed to query for the time instant keys and can
obtain the time instant key for any time point t that can-
not be used to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Type 3
adversaries, who are equipped with a transformation trap-
door, model security against an eavesdropping proxy. We
assume that the proxy in adaptable KP-TIABE is semi-
trusted. That is, the proxy does not collude with any user.
Thus, Type 3 adversaries are not allowed to query for any
private keys.
We now give the security model against Type 1 adver-
saries for adaptable KP-TIABE, described as a security game
between a challenger and a Type 1 adversary. The game pro-
ceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs Setup, Time.Setup and
Adapt.Setup separately to obtain the attribute public
parameter MPK, the time public parameter TS-MPK, the
adaptable public parameter Adp-MPK and an attribute
master secret key MSK, a time master key TS-MSK,
an adaptable master key Adp-MSK. It gives (MPK, TS-
MPK, Adp-MPK, TS-MSK, Adp-MSK) to the adversary
and keeps MSK to itself.
Query Phase 1 The adversary can adaptively query to a
private key extraction oracle to get the private keys cor-
responding to access structures A1, . . . , Aq . Challenger
will respond with ATR-SKAi ← KeyGen(Ai , MPK,
MSK).
Challenge The adversary passes two messages M0, M1, a
time interval tL , tR ⊆ T and a set of attributes S with
the restriction that S cannot satisfy any of the queried
access structures in Query Phase 1. The challenger com-
putes CT = Encrypt(Mβ, S, [tL , tR], MPK, TS-MPK,
Adp-MPK), where β ∈ {0, 1} is chosen randomly. CT
is passed to the adversary.
Query Phase 2 The adversary continues to make private
key extraction queries with the same restriction as in the
Challenge phase.
Guess The adversary outputs its guess β ′ for β.
The advantage of the Type 1 adversary in this game is
defined as |Pr[β = β ′] − 12 |, where the probability is
taken over the random bits used by the challenger and
the Type 1 adversary.
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Definition 5 An adaptable KP-TIABE scheme is secure
against Type 1 adversaries if all PPT adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in the above game.
We say that an adaptable KP-TIABE scheme is selectively
secure against Type 1 adversaries if we add an Init stage
before Setup where the adversary commits to the challenge
set of attributes S.
The security model against Type 2 adversaries for adapt-
able KP-TIABE, which describes a security game between a
challenger and a Type 2 adversary, proceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs Setup, Time.Setup and
Adapt.Setup separately to obtain the attribute public
parameter MPK, the time public parameter TS-MPK, the
adaptable public parameter Adp-MPK and an attribute
master secret keys MSK, a time master key TS-MSK, an
adaptable master key Adp-MSK. It gives (MPK, MSK,
TS-MPK, Adp-MPK) to the adversary and keeps (TS-
MSK, Adp-MSK) to itself.
Query phase 1 The adversary adaptively queries the chal-
lenger for time instant key corresponding to a time tk . In
response, the challenger runs TS-SKtk ←
Token(tk, TS-MSK). Then, it gives the private key
TS-SKtk to the adversary.
Challenge The adversary submits two (equal-length) mes-
sages m0, m1, a set of attributes S and a time inter-
val [tL , tR], subject to the restriction that none of the
queried time instants fall within [tL , tR]. The chal-
lenger selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets CT =
Encrypt(mβ, S, [tL , tR], MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK)
and sends CT to the adversary as the challenge cipher-
text.
Query phase 2 The adversary continues to adaptively query
the challenger for time instant keys corresponding to cer-
tain time instants with the restriction that none of these
instants fall within [tL , tR].
Guess The adversary outputs its guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
Adversary in this game is defined as |Pr[β = β ′] − 12 |,
where the probability is taken over the random bits used
by the challenger and the Type 2 adversary.
Definition 6 An adaptable KP-TIABE scheme is secure
against Type 2 adversaries if all PPT adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in the above game.
The security model against Type 3 adversaries for adaptable
KP-TIABE is described as a security game between a chal-
lenger and a Type 3 adversary. The game proceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs Setup to generate a public para-
meter/master secret key pair (MPK, MSK) firstly and
runs Time-Setup, Adapt-Setup to generate
(TS-MPK,TS-MSK) and (Adp-MPK, Adp-MSK), respec-
tively. Then, it sends (MPK, TS-MPK, TS-MSK,Adp-
MPK, Adp-MSK) to the adversary and keeps MSK to
itself.
Challenge The adversary submits two (equal-length) mes-
sages m0, m1, a set of attributes S and a time interval
[tL , tR]. The challenger selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1},
sets CT = Encrypt(mβ, S, [tL , tR], MPK, TS-MPK,
Adp-MPK) and sends CT to the adversary as the chal-
lenge ciphertext.
Guess The adversary outputs its guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
The advantage of the Type 3 adversary in this game is
defined as |Pr[β = β ′] − 12 | where the probability is
taken over the random bits used by the challenger and
the Type 3 adversary.
Definition 7 An adaptable KP-TIABE scheme is secure
against Type 3 adversaries if all PPT adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in the above game.
6 Construction of an adaptable KP-TIABE scheme
Based on the KP-ABE scheme (Goyal et al. 2006), the TSE
scheme (Kasamatsu et al. 2012) and the adaptable CP-ABE
scheme (Lai et al. 2014), we propose our concrete construc-
tion of adaptable KP-TIABE scheme. Moreover, we provide
the efficiency analysis of our algorithm by comparing it with
the others.
6.1 Construction of adaptable KP-TIABE
This scheme is only selectively secure against Type 1 adver-
saries. The size of public parameters is linear in the number of
attributes in the universe. However, our adaptable KP-TIABE
can be extended to support a large universe of attributes and
achieve full security against Type 1 adversaries.
Concretely, the proposed adaptable KP-TIABE scheme is
described as follows:
(Global − Setup(λ)) Given a security parameter λ as input.
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be
a generator of G. The system public parameters (i.e., a
bilinear group) are PP = (p, G, GT , e, g).
Setup(PP, U ) Given the system’s public parameters PP
and a small universe of attributes U = {1, 2, . . . , |U |},
this algorithm first chooses hi ∈ G uniformly at random
for each attribute i ∈ U . Then, it chooses a α ∈ Zp. The
published attribute public parameters MPK are
MPK = (e(g, g)α, h1, . . . , h|U |).
The attribute master secret key is MSK = α.
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TS-Setup(PP, T ) Given the system’s public parameters
PP and the number of time periods T , this algorithm
chooses a, b ∈ Zp and the time public parameters are
published as
TS-MPK = e(g, g)ab.
The time server’s secret key is TS-MSK = gab. The
system supports time space [0, T − 1].
Adapt-Setup(PP, T ) Given the system’s public parameters
PP and the number of time periods T , this algorithm
proceeds as follows. For each time point i , it chooses γi ∈
Zp uniformly at random and sets Ii = gγi . It then chooses
γ2,F , γ2,B ∈ Zp uniformly at random and sets g2,F =
gγ2,F , g2,B = gγ2,B . The adaptable public parameters are
published as
Adp-MPK = (I0, . . . , IT , g2,F , g2,B).
The server’s master secret key is Adp-MSK =
(γ0, . . . , γT , γ2,F , γ2,B).
KeyGen(A, MPK, MSK) The key generation algorithm takes
as inputs the attribute public parameter MPK, the
attribute master secret key MSK and an LSSS access
structure A = (A, ρ), where A is an  × n matrix and ρ
is a map from each row Ai of A to an attribute ρ(i).
The algorithm first chooses a random vector v ∈ Znp
such that 1 · v = α, where 1 denotes the vector with
the first entry equal to 1 and the rest equal to 0. Then,
for each row Ai of A, it chooses ri ∈ Zp uniformly
at random. The private key related to access structure
ATR-SK = (A = (A, ρ), K 1i , K 2i ) is computed as
K 1i = g Ai ·vh−riρ(i), K 2i = gri ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }.
Token(t, TS-MPK, TS-MSK) The algorithm for time
instant key generation takes as inputs the time point
t , the time public parameters TS-MPK and the time
master secret key TS-MSK. It uniformly chooses ran-
dom values ξ, r ∈ Zp. The time instant key TS-SK =
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I T+kk · g2,B
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,
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⎞
⎠ .
Encrypt (M, S, [tL , tR], MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK) To
encrypt a message M ∈ GT under a set of attributes
S and time interval [tL , tR], separate the message into
two parts, M = M0 · M1. One part of the message,
M0, is encrypted under a set of attributes S, and another
part of the message, M1, is encrypted under the time
interval [tL , tR]. In addition, it chooses random value
s, σ ∈ Zp and publishes the ciphertext as CT =
(S, C0, C ′0, Ci , C1, C2, C3, C4, C5), where:
C0 = M0 · e(g, g)αs,
C ′0 = gs, {Ci = hsi }i∈S,
C1 = M1 · e(g, g)abσ ,
C2 = gσ ,
C3 = (I 2T+10 ·
tR+1∏
k=1
I kk · g2,F )σ ,
C4 = (I 2T+10 ·
T−tL∏
k=1
I T+kk · g2,B)σ ,
C5 = [tL , tR].
PolicyAdp(Adp-MSK, CT, [t ′L , t ′R]) The time modifi-
cation algorithm takes as inputs Adp-MSK, a cipher-
text CT = (S, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, Ci ) and a new
time interval [t ′L , t ′R]. With the help of Adp-MSK =
(γ0, . . . , γT , γ2,F , γ2,B), this algorithm modifies the
ciphertext CT in to a new ciphertext CT ′ under the
time interval [t ′L , t ′R] without changing the underlying
message of CT . Let CT = (S, C0, C ′0, Ci , C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5), where:
C0 = M0 · e(g, g)αs,
C ′0 = gs, {Ci = hsi }i∈S;















I T+kk · g2,B
)σ
,
C5 = [tL , tR].
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This algorithm chooses s˜, σ˜ ∈ Zp uniformly at random.
Let s′ = s + s˜ and σ ′ = σ + σ˜ . Using C2 = gσ and
Adp-MSK = (γ0, . . . , γT , γ2,F , γ2,B), it first computes








k · g2,B)σ . Then, the new ciphertext CT =
(S, C ′0, C ′′0 , C ′i , C ′1, C ′2, C ′3, C ′4, C ′5) is computed as
C ′0 = C0 · e(g, g)αs˜ = M · e(g, g)αs
′
,
C ′′0 = C ′0 · gs˜ = gs
′
, {C ′i = Ci · hs˜i = hs
′
i }i∈S,
C ′1 = C1 · ·e(g, g)abσ˜ = M1 · e(g, g)abσ
′
,
C ′2 = C2 · gσ˜ = gσ
′
,






































C ′5 = [t ′L , t ′R].
Obviously, the distribution of CT ′ is the same as that of
the ciphertext generated by Encrypt(M ∈ GT , S, T ′ =
[t ′L , t ′R], MPK, TS-MPK, Adp-MPK).
Decrypt(CT, ATR-SK, TS-SK) The decryption algorithm
takes as inputs ATR-SK, TS-SK and a ciphertext CT .
The decryption procedure consists of two parts: attribute
constraint part and time constraint part.
Attribute constraint It uses the private key ATR-SK =
(A = (A, ρ), K 1i , K 2i ) for an access structure A = (A, ρ) to
recover the first part of the message, M0, which could be suc-
cessfully decrypted only if the access structure A is satisfied
by the set of attributes S; otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Assume
that the set of attributes S satisfies the access structure A and
we define I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } as I = {i : ρi ∈ S}. Then,
the attribute constraint part of decryption computes constant
ωi ∈ Zp such that ∑i∈I ωi Ai = {1, 0, . . . , 0}, and
dAT R = C0∏
i∈I (e(C ′0, K 1i ) · e(Cρ(i), K 2i ))ωi
= M0
Time constraint This part of decryption requires the time
instant key TS-SK = (skt+1,F , skT−t,B, t). For each time
instant key, there is a specified time point t that the key was
published. As the message M1 is encrypted by a time interval
C5 = [tL , tR], it could be decrypted successfully only if the
specified time point t falls in the time interval C5. Then we
conclude that if t /∈ C5, it returns ⊥. Assuming that time
point t ∈ C5, the time point t needs to be extended to the












, gr , I rtR+2,
. . . , I rT
⎞
⎠














, gr , I rT−tL+1,
. . . , I rT
⎞
⎠
= (R1, R2, bT−tL+1, . . . , bT ).
The time constraint part of decryption computes:
dT S = C1 · e(C3, D2) · e(R2, C4)
e(C2, D1) · e(R1 · C2) = M1
The final message M can be obtained from dART · dT S =
M0 · M1.
Obviously, the above scheme satisfies the correctness of
adaptable KP-TIABE. Next, we state the security theorems
of the scheme.
Theorem 1 If the KP-ABE scheme proposed in Goyal et al.
(2006) is selectively secure, then our proposed adaptable
KP-TIABE scheme is selectively secure against Type 1 adver-
saries.
Proof Since Type 1 adversaries in the adaptable KP-TIABE
scheme model adversaries in a standard KP-ABE scheme,
and the KP-ABE scheme proposed in Goyal et al. (2006) is
selectively secure, then our proposed adaptable KP-TIABE
scheme is also selectively secure against Type 1 adversaries.
Theorem 2 If the ID-TSE scheme proposed in Kasamatsu
et al. (2012) is selectively secure, then our proposed adapt-
able KP-TIABE scheme is selectively secure against Type 2
adversaries.
Proof Since Type 2 adversaries in an adaptable KP-TIABE
scheme model adversaries in the ID-TSE scheme, and the
ID-TSE scheme proposed in Kasamatsu et al. (2012) is
selectively secure, then our proposed adaptable KP-TIABE
scheme is also selectively secure against Type 2 adversaries.
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Table 1 Efficiency summary of ABE schemes
Scheme Out. CT size Out. dec ops Full CT size Full dec ops
GPSW (Goyal et al. 2006) (1 + l)|G| ≤ (1 + l)P + 2l EG |GT | + (1 + l)|G| EGT
LDGW (Lai et al. 2013) (3 + 4l)|G| ≤ (4 + 2l)P + (2 + 4l)EG 2|GT | + |G| 2EG + 2EGT
KP-TIABE (1 + 2l)|G| ≤ (1 + l)P + l EG 2|GT | + |G| EGT
Theorem 3 If the DBDH assumption holds, then our pro-
posed adaptable KP-TIABE is secure against Type 3 adver-
saries.
Proof Suppose there exists a Type 3 adversary A against our
proposed adaptable KP-TIABE scheme with non-negligible
advantage. We are going to construct another PPT B that
makes use of A to solve the DBDH problem with non-
negligible probability.
B is given as input a random 5-tuple (g, gx , gy, gz, T )
that is either sampled from PB DH (where T = e(g, g)xyz)
or from RB DH (where T is uniform and independent in GT ).
Algorithm B’s goal is to output 1 if T = e(g, g)xyz and 0
otherwise. Algorithm B, playing the role of challenger, runs
A executing the following steps.
Setup B chooses random elements h1, . . . , h|U | ∈ G. The
adaptable public parameters are
MPK = (e(gx , gy), h1, . . . , h|U |).
It sets α = xy implicitly, which is unknown to B. Then, B
runs Time-Setup, Adapt-Setup to generate (TS-MPK,TS-
MSK) and (Adp-MPK, Adp-MSK), respectively. Finally, B
sends (MPK, TS-MPK, TS-MSK,Adp-MPK, Adp-MSK) to
adversary A.
Challenge The adversary A outputs two equal-length mes-
sages (M0, M1), a set S of attributes and a time interval
[tL , tR]. B flips a fair coin β ∈ {0, 1} firstly. Then, B chooses
a random M˜ ∈ GT and σ ∈ Zp and computes
C0 = Mβ/M˜ · T,
C ′0 = gz, {Ci = hzi }i∈S,















I T+kk · g2,B
)σ
,
C5 = [tL , tR].
Finally, B sets CT = (S, C0, C ′0, Ci , C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)
as the challenge ciphertext and sends it to A. Obviously, the
challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of Mβ with the cor-
rect distribution whenever T = e(g, g)xyz = e(gx , gy)z =
e(g, g)αz (as is the case when the input 5-tuple is sampled
from PB DH ). On the other hand, when T is uniform and
independent in GT (which occurs when the input 5-tuple is
sampled from RB DH ), the challenge ciphertext CT is inde-
pendent of β in the adversary’s view.
Guess The adversary A outputs a bit β ′. If β ′ = β, then B
outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g)xyz . Otherwise, it outputs 0
meaning T = e(g, g)xyz .
Observe that when the input 5-tuple is sampled from
PB DH (where T = e(g, g)xyz), then A’s view is identical to
its view in a real attack game. On the other hand, when the
input 5-tuple is sampled from RB DH (where T is uniform in
GT ), then the value of β is information-theoretically hidden
from the adversary A. Thus, if A breaks our proposed adapt-
able KP-TIABE scheme with non-negligible advantage, then
B will solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible proba-
bility.
6.2 Performance comparison
We compare the performance of our scheme with the other
ABE schemes (Goyal et al. 2006; Lai et al. 2013). They
have already been used to encrypt users’ private data with
a higher encryption performance. In Table 1, l refers as an
LSSS access structure of l × n matrix. We use P , EG, EGT
to represent the maximum time to compute a pairing, an
exponentiation in G and an exponentiation in GT . The “Out.
CT size” and “Full CT size” represent the ciphertext that is
referred as the input of PolicyAdp and Decrypt, respectively.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced an extension of KP-ABE, called
adaptable key-policy attribute-based encryption with time
interval (KP-TIABE), by novelly combining the standard
key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), adaptable
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) and
time-specific encryption (TSE). We formalized the notion
of KP-TIABE and presented an concrete scheme based on
an algebraic combination of the KP-ABE scheme in Goyal
et al. (2006), the adaptable CP-ABE scheme in Lai et al.
(2014) and the TSE scheme in Paterson and Quaglia (2010).
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We believe that adaptable KP-TIABE finds many practical
applications since it not only deals with access control of
encrypted data based on the relationship between attributes
and access policies, but also puts constraint on the time of
decryption. Moreover, KP-TIABE is able to adjust decryp-
tion time intervals associated with ciphertexts according to
users’ requirements, which makes it especially attractive in
dynamic system settings.
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